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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-ASSUMPTION OF
LIABILITY IN SALE OF ASSETS
One of the usual factors to be considered in the acquisition of
one corporation by another is whether the transferee is to assume
the transferor's liabilities. Often the intent of the parties can be
effectuated by choosing one form of acquisition over another. For
example, if the parties intend that the transferee assume all of the
liabilities of the transferor, the transaction could be structured as
a merger because, by operation of law, the transferee assumes all
of the transferor's liabilities in a merger.' On the other hand, if the
parties decide that the transferee will assume none of the trans-
feror's liabilities, the acquisition could be structured as a sale of
assets. Subject to a few well-recognized exceptions, the general
rule is that such a transaction will shield the transferee from the
assumption of any of the transferor's liabilities.
2
Several recent decisions have dealt with the issue of whether
this general rule of nonassumption applies where a person is in-
jured by a defective product manufactured and sold by a corpora-
tion that has since transferred its assets to another corporation.
The courts have used two types of analyses to assign liability in
such situations. On the basis of public policy, some cases have held
that the rule of nonassumption does not apply to products liability
claims arising after the asset transfer. Other cases have held the
rule of nonassumption applicable in such situations and have con-
strued the contract of sale to determine whether the transferee
expressly or impliedly assumed such liability.
This article will engage in a brief discussion of these cases and
will attempt to demonstrate that these two seemingly disparate
types of analysis must be welded into a single rule to insure com-
pensation for an injured plaintiff while at the same time permit-
ting maximum flexibility as to form in corporate acquisitions.
I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 7117-21 (Revised
Volume 1973) (hereinafter cited as FLETCHER).
2 FLETCHER § 7122. The exceptions to this general rule of nonassumption are
where there is (1) an express or implied assumption of such liability, (2) a finding
that the transaction was a consolidation or a merger, (3) a finding that the transac-
tion was fraudulent in fact, or (4) a finding that the transferee is a mere continua-
tion of the transferor. Id.
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I. THE PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
When confronted with a choice between applying the general
rule of nonassumption or not, some courts have held the rule in-
applicable to products liability claims on the basis of public policy.
The justifications given by the courts in these decisions are sub-
stantially the same as those given for imposing strict liability on a
manufacturer in an ordinary products liability suit.
For example, in Ray v. Alad Corp.,' the Alad Corporation
(hereinafter "Alad I") sold its assets to the Light Maintenance
Corporation, which later changed its name to Alad Corporation
(hereinafter "Alad II") in 1968. One of the provisions of the con-
tract of sale was that Alad II would not assume any liability for
defective work or materials for which Alad I was responsible. Alad
I was dissolved in 1968 under the laws of the State of California.
In 1969, the plaintiff was injured as the result of an allegedly
defective ladder produced and sold by Alad I. The plaintiff sued
Alad II and the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment
in favor of the defendant.4 The opinion of the trial court was based
on an application of the general rule of nonassumption and a find-
ing that the transferee, Alad II, did not assume the liability of the
transferor by contract.'
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, hold-
ing that the case could not be decided on the basis of contract law,
but instead that the principles of tort law should apply. The court
held that the liability of Alad I for defective products would, in
effect, follow its assets to Alad II, because the public policy justifi-
cations for imposing strict liability on Alad I, as the manufacturer
of the defective product, were substantially the same when applied
to Alad II, the transferee of the assets.'
The court first noted that, as a matter of public policy, the
incentive to improve defective products is most effectively placed
3 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976).
127 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
With respect to its decision, the trial court stated:
Alad II did not assume the unspecified liabilities of Alad I and further
. . . Alad II was not a mere continuation or reincarnation of the old
corporation but a new organization, resulting from a purchase based on
substantial consideration of the assets and the trade-name of the old
corporation. Id. at 819.
1 Id. at 820-21.
[Vol. 79
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on the firm which now produces the product. Another public policy
justification for applying strict liability in this instance, according
to the court, is that a business which continues a particular busi-
ness activity is better able to distribute the individual and social
costs of that enterprise. These factors lead the court to determine
that the liability for defective products should be placed on the
transferee of the corporate assets as a continuation of the manufac-
turing entity which produced the defective product. In doing so,
the court rejected the general rule of nonassumption, stating:
The manufacturing entity's responsibility to victims of defec-
tive products it has placed in circulation cannot be hostage to
the niceties which distinguish a sale from a merger.
7
It is interesting to note that the court specifically refused to
base its decision on the fact that, as a dissolved corporation, Alad
I could not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries; holding instead
that the liability of the transferee of corporate assets does "not
depend on whether or not former owners of the business can re-
spond in damages."'
A more in-depth example of this type of analysis is found in
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc.,' where the plaintiffs were injured as
the result of an alleged defect in a printing machine. The jury
returned a verdict against B. Offen & Co., which the defendant
appealed alleging that, as a matter of law, it could not be held
liable because it was not a legal entity at the time the defective
printing press was sold.
The printing press which injured the plaintiff was designed,
manufactured, and sold in 1959 by B. Offen Company, then a sole
proprietorship owned by Bernard Offen. In 1962, Offen died and
employees took over the business. In 1963, the employee group was
joined by a single financier and the company was purchased, ap-
parently from the Offen estate.
Although the defendant assumed many of the proprietorship's
liabilities, the contract specifically provided against the assump-
tion of liability for costs incurred in tort." Despite this contractual
Id. at 821.
Id. at 820 n.7.
501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
10 The contract of sale provided that the purchaser assumed the following:
the liability for all costs of any kind or nature incurred on or after January
1141
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disclaimer and the general rule of nonassumption, the court found
the defendant liable." The court disposed of the defendant's two
major defenses holding, first, the fact that the defendant was not
in legal existence at the time the defective product was sold was
of no consequence because the defendant could be held liable as a
continuation of the transferor, and second, although the contract
negating the assumption of liability might be binding between the
parties, it was not binding on third parties who had no notice of
the change of ownership.'"
Having disposed of these threshold issues, the court found the
defendant liable as a continuation of B. Offen & Co. on the basis
of public policy. The holding was based on a finding that the
public policy justifications for imposing strict liability on a manu-
facturer are also applicable to a transferee of the manufacturer's
assets. The court listed the justifications for imposing strict liabil-
ity oh the manufacturer as follows: (1) the manufacturer is better
able to protect itself and bear the cost of injury than a consumer;
(2) the manufacturer produced the product and put it on the mar-
ket; (3) the manufacturer breached the product warranty; (4) the
manufacturer can improve the product; and (5) the manufac-
turer's employees are the ones who negligently produced the
product.'"
The court found the first of these justifications applicable to
the situation before it because the transferee of the assets is suffi-
ciently familiar with the product to insure itself against suits for
defective products. Since the transferee reaps the goodwill of hav-
ing the goods of the transferor placed on the market, the court
found the second and third justifications applicable. The court
found the fourth justification present because the transferee is the
only one who can improve the product after the asset sale. Regard-
ing the fifth factor, the court seemed to hold that it would be
applicable any time the transferee continues the transferor's oper-
ation with the same employees, as the defendant did in this case."
16, 1963 on Old Dryer and Service Contracts, . . . but excluding specifi-
cally liability for costs incurred in tort. Id. at 1151.
" Id. at 1154.
" Id. at 1153.
' Id. at 1154.
" With respect to this justification the court stated:
Finally, a corporation itself cannot act. It can conduct its business only
[Vol. 79
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From these decisions it is clear that at least some courts are
unwilling to apply the general rule of nonassumption to product
liability claims on the basis of public policy where the original
justifications for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer also
apply to the transferee of corporate assets.'"
I1. THE NONASSUMPTION CASES
Despite this trend, most recent decisions have applied the
general rule of nonassumption to product liability actions. In such
cases the courts are forced to analyze the contract of sale to deter-
mine whether the transferee has either expressly or impliedly as-
sumed liability for defective products manufactured by the trans-
feror. Furthermore, the court must examine the transaction in
order to determine whether any of the exceptions" to the general
rule of nonassumption are applicable.
The first step, then, in applying the general rule of nonas-
sumption to a sale of assets is a construction of the contract. If the
contract does not speak to the assumption of product liability, the
general rule applies and the transferee is not liable for the plain-
tiff's injuries. One problem courts are often faced with, therefore,
is a need to determine whether a particular contractual provision
evidences an intent by the parties that the transferee assume such
liability. For example, in Bouton v. Litton Industries Inc.,'5 the
plaintiff was injured by a defective aircraft arresting engine. The
plaintiff sued both the M-T Liquidation Corporation, seller of the
defective engine, and Litton Industries, transferee of all of M-T's
assets. Both defendants contended that the following contractual
provision shielded them from liability.
through its officers and employees. The negligence of employees in carry-
ing out that business is the responsibility of the corporate body. If as a
group the same employees continue, without pause to produce the same
products in the same plant, with the same supervision, the ownership of
the entity which maintains essentially the same name cannot be the sole
controlling determinant of liability. Id. at 1154.
," In anticipation of the discussion to follow, it is important to keep in mind
that, although the justification mentioned would apply where the transferor was
still a viable corporate entity at the time of the suit, the transferors in these cases
were dissolved at the time of the lawsuit in question.
" See note 2 supra.
'; See FLETCHER § 7122.
" 423 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1970).
5
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[Litton assumes] all other contracts and commitments entered
into in the regular and ordinary course of M-T's business at
anytime before or after May 31, 1962 and prior to the transfer
date.'"
The court held that this language was sufficiently broad to
encompass future claims for defective products and held Litton
liable for the plaintiff's injuries."0 The court was aided in its inter-
pretation of the contract by provisions which indicated that Litton
was to assume debts, such as that owed to the plaintiff, which
could be contested and had not been insured against by M-T.2'
Another case where the court had difficulty in interpreting
provisions of a contract of sale is Husak v. Berkel, Inc.,2 where the
plaintiff was injured by an allegedly defective food grinding ma-
chine. The plaintiff sued SCM, the successor in a merger of the
manufacturer of the machine, along with Berkel, Inc., the eventual
transfereen of the business and assets that had produced the defec-
tive machine.
The only issue facing the court was whether the following
contractual provision evidenced an intent on the part of the parties
that the transferee assume liability for defective products pro-
duced by the transferor.
[The transferee] agrees to assume all liabilities, obligations,
contracts, orders for the purchase of material and warranties of
[the transferor] made in connection with the manufacture and
sale of products assigned hereunder to [the transferee] as part
of the commercial and industrial line.Y
The court held that this language was so ambiguous that it
was not clear whether the transferee had assumed liability for
defective products manufactured by the transferor. However, this
ambiguity was construed most strongly against SCM, since its
counsel had prepared the contract." As a result, Berkel was not
liable for the plaintiff's injuries.
11 Id. at 649.
21 Id. at 650.
21 Id.
" 234 Pa. Super. 452, 341 A.2d 174 (1975).
21 Berkel was actually the successor of the original transferee, Enterprise-1956,
in a merger. As a result, all liabilities assumed by Enterprise-1956 were subse-
quently assumed by Berkel.
2, 234 Pa. Super. at 457, 341 A.2d at 177.
Id. at 461, 341 A.2d at 178.
[Vol. 79
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss1/9
STUDENT NOTES
It is important to note that in the Bouton and Berkel
decisions, both the transferee and the transferor were viable corpo-
rate entities, capable of satisfying the plaintiffs' claims at the time
of the respective suits. As a result, the courts in these two decisions
were not faced with a situation where the plaintiff could recover
only against the transferee, if he was to recover at all. Thus, it can
be argued that the facts in these cases would not lead a court to
disregard the general rule of nonassumption on public policy
grounds.
Assuming that the court finds no express or implied assump-
tion of liability in the contract of sale, its next step in applying the
general rule of nonassumption is to determine whether the transac-
tion is of such a nature that it fits within one of the exceptions to
the general rule of nonassumption. These exceptions dictate that
the general rule will not apply where the transaction results in a
mere continuation or consolidation of the original business, a de
facto merger or is entered into in order to fraudulently avoid liabil-
ity.26
Wilson v. Fare Well Corp.,2 presents a situation where a court
failed to apply the general rule of nonassumption because the
transferee of the corporate assets was merely a continuation of the
transferor. The court found the argument for applying the contin-
uation exception convincing because all of the operations of the
transferor were taken over by the transferee, much of the manage-
ment remained the same, and there was a recognition by both
parties that the transferee was" 'taking over and carrying on'" the
transferor's business."
Wilson should, however, be contrasted with Oritz v. South
Bend Lathe2 1 where many of the same factors were present. In that
case the plaintiff was injured by a defective lathe produced by the
transferor. The transferor had sold its assets and dissolved prior to
the suit, leaving the plaintiff with no recourse but to sue the trans-
feree. Although the transferee carried on the same operations in
the same place as the transferor, the court failed to find that it was
a continuation of the transferor. The holding was based on the fact
that the transferee had paid an adequate consideration for the
2 See note 2 supra.
140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976).
356 A.2d at 466-67.
46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975).
7
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transferor's assets. This made it impossible for the court to find a
continuation because "[b]efore one corporation can be said to be
a mere continuation or reincarnation of another it is required that
there be insufficient consideration running from the new company
to the old."30 Thus, it appears that the decision in Oritz is in direct
opposition to the holding in Wilson where no allegation or finding
of insufficient consideration occurred.
The most litigated exception to the general rule of nonassump-
tion is the de facto merger exception. In Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co.,' the court held that a de facto merger had occurred
where (1) the consideration for the assets of the transferor was
common stock of the transferee; (2) all of the transferor's employ-.
ees became employees of the transferee; (3) the operating manage-
ment of the transferor was left substantially intact by the trans-
feree; and (4) the headquarters, operation, and organization of the
corporation remained basically the same before and after the
transfer.
A similar result was reached in Cinocca v. Baxter Laborato-
ries, Inc., 2 where the plaintiff allegedly died because of the mal-
function of a defective Mitral Heart Valve Prosthesis manufac-
tured by Surgitool, Inc. Prior to the malfunction, Surgitool had
sold substantially all of its assets to Travenol Laboratories, Inc. In
considering Travenol's motion for a summary judgment, the court
applied the general rule of nonassumption, but failed to absolve
Travenol because it could not hold as a matter of law that no
merger had taken place." The finding was based on the fact that
the consideration paid the transferor was common stock of the
transferee and that the parties treated the sale as a nontaxable
reorganization under the Internal Revenue Code34 rather than as a
sale of assets which would have been a taxable exchange.
One factor which has dissuaded courts from applying the de
facto merger exception in situations such as that presented in
Baxter is the continuation of the transferor as a corporate entity
after the asset acquisition. In Lopata v. Bemis Company, Inc.,"
10 Id. at 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
, 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
32 400 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Okla. 1975).
Id. at 530.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(C).
406 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
[Vol. 79
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the Rock Wool Engineering & Equipment Corp. transferred all of
its physical assets to the defendant Bemis Co. A year later Rock
Wool dissolved. Subsequently, the plaintiff was injured while oper-
ating an allegedly defective machine produced by Rock Wool prior
to the asset transfer. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
the transaction was not an asset sale, but was in fact a merger
between Bemis and Rock Wool. The holding was based on the fact
that Rock Wool had continued to exist for a year after the asset
acquisition and, as a result, the absorption of one corporation by
another implied by a merger could not have occurred.
3
1
A similar analysis was presented in McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Company," where, in 1926, Seybold, by contract, sold all of its
assets to Harris Automatic Press Company. Seybold subsequently
changed its name and dissolved in 1928. The plaintiff was injured
in 1968 while operating an allegedly defective paper machine man-
ufactured by Seybold in 1916. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim of
a de facto merger, the court noted that the continued existence of
Seybold for eighteen months after the acquisition indicated that
the transferor had not been merged into the transferee .3 In addi-
tion, the court noted that the consideration passing from the trans-
feree to the transferor contained only a small amount of the trans-
feree's securities making the finding of a merger in this case diffi-
cult.3
III. CONCLUSIONS
The decisions discussed above indicate that there is a split of
authority in United States jurisdictions regarding whether the gen-
eral rule of nonassumption of liabilities in a corporate asset acquis-
tion should be applied to products liability claims. Although it
might be normal to conclude that one rule is better than the other
in such situations, a thorough analysis indicates that neither rule
alone is sufficient to promote a just result, and therefore, concur-
' Id. at 526-27.
3 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
-" Id. at 563-64, 264 A.2d at 104-05.
3, Id. at 564, 264 A.2d at 104. This factor mitigates against finding a merger
because a merger generally is distinguished by a continuation of the enterprise and
the stockholders' interests therein, whereas a sale of assets normally contemplates
the liquidation of the enterprise. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293,
93 A.2d 107 (1952).
9
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rent application of the two rules seems desirable. This conclusion
results from an analysis of the goals which courts should strive to
attain in this area. The first of these goals is that of compensating
the plaintiff regardless of the form of the transaction and the pres-
ent status of the corporations involved. The second goal which
appears to be desirable in this area is to make the law flexible
enough to permit the parties to a corporate transaction to deter-
mine which of them will bear the burden for products liability
claims. This second goal, however, should be subordinate to the
first goal so the parties, in their decision regarding who should bear
this burden, will not be able to deny the plaintiff an effective
remedy.
An analysis of the cases in this area leads to the conclusion
that neither a rigid application nor a rejection of the general rule
of nonassumption, as stated by the courts, can satisfy both of these
goals. Regarding the public policy decisions rejecting the general
rule of nonassumption, it appears that a rigid application of the
analysis forwarded by those decisions will not necessarily satisfy
either one of the goals discussed above. A superficial analysis
might indicate that rejection of the general rule of nonassumption
would provide the plaintiff with a recovery in every instance. A
closer examination, however, discloses that the plaintiff, under the
rules established in the decisions to date, would be able to recover
only from the transferee and, then, only if certain conditions are
fulfilled.
In Alad40 and Cyr4' the courts shifted responsibility to the
transferee for defective products produced by the transferor by
demonstrating that public policy requires such a transfer, regard-
less of the status of the two corporations at the time of the suit.42
The application of such a rule will not provide a plaintiff with
compensation in every instance. For example, if the transferor of
the corporate assets is in existence at the time of the plaintiffs
injury, but the transferee has since dissolved, it is clear that the
plaintiff will be denied effective relief if the burden is shifted to
the transferee,43 despite the fact that the corporation which pro-
0 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976).
1 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
12 See text accompanying notes 3-15 supra, especially that accompanying note
8 supra.
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duced the defective product is still able to compensate the plain-
tiff.,,
It is also clear that the courts under the public policy rationale
will compensate the plaintiff only when the justifications for ignor-
ing the general rule of nonassumption are present. For example,
the Cyr4 decision was based on a finding by the court that the
public policy justifications for imposing strict liability on a manu-
facturer was sufficiently present to impose liability on the trans-
feree of those assets which produced the product. Whatever the
analysis used, it is clear that these justifications will not be present
in the same degree and quantity in every case. As a result, there
is a question whether the public policy analysis would provide
compensation to a plaintiff even in a situation where the transferee
of corporate assets is able to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. For exam-
ple, regarding the justification that the transferee is the only one
who can correct the defective product,46 it is clear that this element
will not be present in every case. In the area of products liability,
the alleged defective product is sometimes as much as fifty years
old." As a result, it is likely that at least in some cases the corpora-
tion which originally produced the product or the transferee of that
corporation's assets has corrected the defect occurring in the older
machine, or has even completely changed the particular model of
the machine. If this is the case, there is no justification for impos-
ing liability on the transferee in the hope that it will cause the
corporation to correct a now nonexistent defect.
Another justification mentioned by the courts is that the
transferee obtains the goodwill benefits of having the transferor's
goods on the market."8 This may be the case in some instances, but
it is clearly not true in all situations. For example, if the transferee
changes the name of the product or significantly alters it, the
transferee would reap no benefits from having the transferor's
products on the market. 9 Also, it is doubtful that the transferee
" Although this type of fact situation has never been faced by a court, the
posited result would seem to be dictated by the analysis presented in the public
policy cases.
" 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974).
' See text accompanying note 13 supra.
+ In McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div.
1970), the allegedly defective machine was produced in 1916 while the plaintiff's
injury occurred in 1968.
" See text accompanying note 13 supra.
4' For example, in Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 222 F.2d 355
11
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will continue the transferor's operation with the same employees
in all situations. Thus, this justification for imposing liability on
the transferee will not always be present."0
From this analysis it is apparent that the only justification
which will be present in every case is that the transferee is more
capable of sustaining the loss and spreading its burden than is the
plaintiff." One could question whether this would be a sufficient
justification to impose liability on a transferee. If so, it is not
apparent from the Alad5" and Cyr 3 decisions where the respective
courts relied on much more than this factor alone in making their
decisions. Therefore, until a more definitive statement of the law
in this area is rendered it must be assumed that this justification
alone is not sufficient. 4 Thus, it is not clear that the rejection of
the nonassumption rule will necessarily lead to an effective remedy
for the plaintiff in all cases.
In addition, it is apparent from the decisions rejecting the
general rule of nonassumption that such rejection makes corporate
transactions in this area unnecessarily rigid. The rationale behind
these decisions is that the liability for defective products belongs
to the transferee regardless of a contractual stipulation to the con-
trary.55 As a result, courts may not give effect to contractual provi-
sions placing liability on the transferor for defective products pro-
duced by it, even though the transferor is in a position to satisfy
the claim of the plaintiff at the time of suit.
Given this conclusion, it becomes impossible for the transferee
to shift the burden of liability for defective products manufactured
(7th Cir. 1955), the court held that the taxpayer did not acquire the goodwill of the
purchased corporation where the taxpayer intended to sell the same product under
its own name.
10 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
' See text accompanying note 13 supra.
" 55 Cal. App. 3d, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976).
53 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
s, If superior loss-bearing ability were the sole rationale, the burden could be
placed on any corporation regardless of its connection with the assets as long as it,
in fact, had the ability to bear the loss.
" This is clear from Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974),
in which the court held the contract between the transferor and the transferee to
be of no effect on the plaintiff, and from Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 855,
127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), where the court noted that the general rule of nonassump-
tion would not be applied even where the transferor is in a position to satisfy the
plaintiff's claim at the time of suit.
[Vol. 79
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by the transferor. It is evident, therefore, that any negotiations
regarding the sale of corporate assets in a jurisdiction not applying
the general rule of nonassumption will have to take this factor into
account, with the result that the transferor will probably be re-
quired to accept a lower price for its assets because of this contin-
gent and speculative liability which may be placed on the trans-
feree sometime in the future. The transaction is thus rigidified
because it does not permit the transferor to obtain a price equal
to the value of his assets and forces the transferee to assume a
liability of unknown proportions at the time of the sale. It would
appear to make much more sense to permit the parties to negotiate
the price of the assets separately and then arrive at some decision
with respect to products liability, rather than predetermining
where such liability will be placed.
It can be argued, of course, that this result can be accom-
plished if the contract is made binding between the parties, but
not binding between an injured plaintiff and the transferee.M
While this may be true, it still presents a less desirable state of
affairs than if the contract is binding between the plaintiff and the
transferee. For example, suppose that C, transfers its assets to C2
with a contractual provision stating that C,. will assume all liabil-
ity for defective products manufactured by it.57 Suppose further
that X is injured as the result of a defective product manufactured
by C.. X then sues C, and C2. If the nonassumption rule is applied
C2 is entitled to a summary judgment and C, would bear the loss
of any verdict rendered in favor of X. If, however, the general rule
of nonassumption is rejected C, would be entitled to a summary
judgment as against the plaintiff. However, since C, is contrac-
tually bound to reimburse C2 for X's recovery, it might desire to
remain a party to the suit to protect its economic interest. In
addition, it is clear that C2 can keep C, in the suit as a party who
will be liable to C2 if X prevails." As a result, both C, and C will
have to endure a trial and the consequent legal fees. This is clearly
more inefficient than a situation whereby the contract is enforced
and C, is the only defendant in the suit.
"' See note 53 supra.
51 The following discussion assumes that both the transferor and the transferee
are viable entities at the time of the suit, with resources sufficient to satisfy the
plaintiff's claim.
11 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 14(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
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It is evident, therefore, that the rejection of the nonassump-
tion rule, as announced by the courts, does not provide a clear path
to the attainment of the goals of compensating the plaintiff and
permitting flexibility in corporate transactions. It is equally clear,
however, that an application of the general rule of nonassumption
is deficient in rendering these goals attainable. Although the gen-
eral rule of nonassumption gives the transferor and the transferee
the power to allocate liability for defective products manufactured
by the transferor, it does not insure that an injured plaintiff will
be compensated. The reason is that if the liability rests with the
transferor or the transferee under the general rule and that corpo-
ration dissolves prior to the suit, the plaintiff is denied an effective
remedy.
For example, if the transferee fails to assume liability and the
transferor dissolves, the plaintiff will be left without remedy unless
he is able to establish the transaction as an exception to the gen-
eral rule of nonassumption.5 9
The above demonstrates that neither of these rules, by itself,
satisfies the two goals which appear desirable in this area of the
law. As a result, either a new rule or a synthesis of these two rules
is needed. It appears that a synthesis of the public policy opinions
and the nonassumption opinions would produce a rule which satis-
fies the two goals and does not involve a great departure from
existing law.
The first goal, that of compensating the plaintiff, can easily
be satisfied by a modification of the public policy analysis which
led to the rejection of the general rule of nonassumption. Thus, the
first tenet of the new rule would be that the plaintiff must be
compensated by the transferee or the transferor. This rule can be
justified solely on the basis of public policy, since either one of
these entities is better able to bear the burden of the plaintiff's
injury than is the plaintiff. This will require that the other public
policy justifications for rejecting the general rule of nonassumption
be forgotten. Furthermore, it will somewhat restrict the ability of
the-parties to allocate the burden for defective products in any way
they choose.
The parties will, however, still have the power to allocate this
5' McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
[Vol. 79
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burden subject to the constraint that those injured by defective
products be compensated. Thus, the parties may allocate the bur-
den in the contract of sale and this allocation would be binding on
both the parties and the plaintiff, except where the party to which
the burden is allocated is dissolved or unable to respond in dam-
ages. In the exceptional situation, the other party would be liable
for the plaintiff's injury.
The case which comes closest to articulating this type of anal-
ysis is Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,"° where the de-
fendant was injured in the course of his employment, in 1969, by
an alleged defect in a machine known as a packomatic. The ma-
chine had been manufactured by Textile Machine Works,
hereinafter referred to as TMW, and sold to the defendant's em-
ployer in 1966 or 1967. In 1968, TMW sold all of its assets with the
exception of its corporate seal, its articles of incorporation, its
corporate records and $500,000 in cash to American Rockwell. The
sales agreement specified that Rockwell would assume certain ob-
ligations and liabilities of TMW, but did not provide for the as-
sumption of liability for defective products. Subsequent to the
consummation of the sale, TMW technically continued to exist
until its dissolution approximately eighteen. months later. During
that time TMW had none of its former assets and was required to
dissolve by contract as soon as possible.
The analysis which the court used in holding the defendant
liable is interesting because, unlike the analyses in the other cases
mentioned in this article, it neither fully accepts nor fully rejects
the general rule of nonassumption as controlling in this type of
situation. Rather, the court uses an analysis similar to that sug-
gested above which blends these two disparate positions into a
somewhat consistent whole. First, the court notes the general rule
of nonassumption and its exceptions.' The court then considers
the plaintiff's claim that the transaction in question is within the
merger exception to the general rule of nonassumption, noting that
generally a merger does not take place when, as here, the selling
corporation continues to exist after the sale.2 Despite this, the
court held the defendant liable on the basis of the insubstantiality
of that continued existence and more importantly on the public
80 506 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir. 1974).
81 Id. at 363-64.
82 Id. at 365.
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policy implications that the finding of a merger would have. These
public policy considerations involved the plaintiffs inability to
recover from the transferor and the transferee's ability to insure
against and spread the burden of the plaintiffs loss.
It is apparent, therefore, that the court in Knapp was result-
oriented" and was not willing to establish a rigid rule to control
such situations. As a result, this decision permits maximum flexi-
bility in corporate transactions while protecting against the unde-
sired result of a plaintiff not being compensated. The court does
so by finding what is in essence a public policy exception to the
general rule of nonassumption.
Whether the Knapp decision goes so far as to hold that the
plaintiff must be compensated regardless of the status of the trans-
feror and transferee at the time of the suit is uncertain. What is
certain is that the decision is a step in that direction.
Despite the well-reasoned analysis in Knapp, it is probable
that most courts will continue to cling to one of the two divergent
positions, one denying the plaintiff an effective remedy in some
instances, the other unduly rigidifying corporate transactions.
James Ronald Snyder
' Note the following statement by the court:
If we are to follow the philosophy of Pennsylvania courts that questions
of an injured party's right to seek recovery are to be resolved by an
analysis of public policy considerations rather than by a mere procrus-
tean application of formalities, we must, in considering whether the
TMW-Rockwell exchange was a merger, evaluate the public policy impli-
cations of that -determination. Id. at 369. (Emphasis added).
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